A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed to render CFR tractable. Abstractions are often manually tuned, possibly removing important strategic differences in the full game and harming performance. Function approximation provides a natural solution to finding good abstractions to approximate the full game. A common approach to incorporating function approximation is to learn the inputs needed for a regret minimizing algorithm, allowing for generalization across many regret minimization problems. This paper gives regret bounds when a regret minimizing algorithm uses estimates instead of true values. This form of analysis is the first to generalize to a larger class of (Φ, f )-regret matching algorithms, and includes different forms of regret such as swap, internal, and external regret. We demonstrate how these results give a slightly tighter bound for Regression Regret-Matching (RRM), and present a novel bound for combining regression with Hedge.
Introduction
The dominant framework for approximating Nash equilibria in extensive-form games with imperfect information is Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), and it has successfully been used to solve and expertly play human-scale poker games [1, 2, 3, 4] . This framework is built on the idea of decomposing a game into a network of simple regret minimizers [5, 6] . For very large games, abstraction is typically used to reduce the size and yield a strategically similar game that is feasible to solve with CFR [5, 7, 8, 9] .
Function approximation is a natural generalization of abstraction. In CFR, this amounts to estimating the regrets for each regret minimizer instead of storing them all in a table [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Function approximation can be competitive with domain specific state abstraction [10, 11, 12] , and in some cases is able to outperform tabular CFR without abstraction if the players are optimizing against their best responses [14] .
Combining regression and regret-minimization with applications to CFR was initially studied by Waugh et. al. [10] , introducing the RRM theorem-giving a sufficient condition for function approximator error to still achieve no external regret. In this paper we generalize the RRM theorem to a larger class of regret-minimizers and Φ-regret-a set of regret metrics that include external regret, internal regret, and swap regret. Extending to a larger class of regret-minimizers provides insight into the effectiveness of combining function approximation and regret minimization-the effect of function approximation error on the bounds will vary between algorithms. Furthermore, extending to other algorithms can give theory for existing or future methods. For example, there has been interest in a functional version of hedge, an algorithm within the studied class, for general multiagent and non-stationary settings that can outperform softmax policy gradient methods [13] . Extending to a more general class of regret metrics such as internal regret allows for potentially-novel applications of regret minimization and function approximation including finding an approximate correlated equilibrium [16] .
Preliminaries
We adopt the notation from Greenwald et al. [17] to describe an online decision problem (ODP). An ODP consists of a set of possible actions A and set of possible rewards R. In this paper we assume a finite set of actions and bounded 1 R ⊂ R + where sup R = U . The tuple (A, R) fully characterizes the problem and is referred to as a reward system. Furthermore, let Π denote the set of reward functions.
At each round t an agent selects a distribution over actions q t ∈ ∆(A) 2 , samples an action a t ∼ q t and then receives the reward function r t ∈ Π. The agent is able to compute the rewards for actions that were not taken at time t in contrast to the bandit setting where the agent only observes r t (a t ). Crucially, each r t is allowed to be selected arbitrarily from Π. As a consequence, this ODP model is flexible enough to encompass multi-agent, adversarial interactions, and game theoretic equilibrium concepts even though it is described from the perspective of a single agent's decisions.
A learning algorithm in an ODP selects q t using information from the history of observations and actions previously taken. We denote this information at time t as historyt h ∈ H t :
Action Transformations
To generalize the analysis to different forms of regret (e.g. swap, internal, and external regret), it is useful to define action transformations. Action transformations are functions of the form φ : A → ∆(A), giving a distribution over actions for each action input. Let Φ ALL := Φ ALL (A) denote the set of all action transformations for the set of actions A and Φ SW AP := Φ SW AP (A) the set of all action transformations with codomain as the set of all pure strategies for action set A. 
We have that |Φ SW AP | = |A| |A| , Φ EXT = |A|, |Φ IN T | = |A| 2 − |A| + 1 [17] .
We will also make use of the linear transformation
Regret
For a given action transformation φ we can compute the difference in expected reward for a particular action and reward function. This expected difference, known as φ-regret, is denoted by
For an ODP with observed history h at time t, with reward functions {r s } t s=1 and actions {a s } t s=1 , the cumulative Φ-regret for time t and action transformations Φ is
For brevity we will omit the h argument, and for convenience we set R Φ 0 = 0. Note that R Φ t is a random 1 The restriction of positive rewards is without loss of generality and is only used for convenience. 2 ∆(A) is the set of all probability distributions over actions in A.
vector, and we seek to bound
Choosing Φ EXT , Φ IN T , Φ SW AP for (1) amounts to minimizing external regret, internal regret, and swap regret respectively. One can also change (1) by interchanging the max and the expectation. In RRM, max [10, 11] , however, bounds for (1) still apply [17, Corollary 18 ].
Approximate Regret-Matching
A (Φ, f )-regret-matching algorithm is an ODP algorithm characterized by a set of action transformations Φ and a link function f : [17] . Examples of (Φ, f )-regret-matching algorithms include Hart's algorithm [18] -typically called "regret-matching" or the polynomial weighted average forecaster [16] -and Hedge [19] -the exponentially weighted average forecaster [16] , with link functions f (x) i = (x + i ) p−1 for p ≥ 1, and f (x) i = e ηxi with parameter η > 0, respectively. A useful technique to bounding regret when estimates are used in place of true values is to define an ǫ−Blackwell condition, as was used in the RRM theorem [10] . RRM is a specific instance of the (Φ, f ) class where Φ = Φ EXT and f is the polynomial link with p = 2. To generalize across different link functions and Φ ⊆ Φ ALL we define the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell condition.
The Regret Matching Theorem [17] shows that the (Φ, f )-Blackwell condition (ǫ = 0) holds with equality for any finite set of action transformations Φ and link function f : [20] . An algorithm that chooses the above fixed point of M t when R Φ t−1 ∈ R |Φ| + \ {0} and arbitrarily otherwise is (Φ, f )−regret-matching.
We seek to bound objective (1) when an algorithm at time t chooses the fixed point ofM t =
possibly from a function approximator. Such an algorithm is referred to as approximate (Φ, f )-regret-matching.
Similarly to the RRM theorem [10, 11] , we show that the ǫ parameter of the (Φ, f, ǫ)-Blackwell condition depends on the error in approximating the exact link outputs, Given reward system (A,R) , a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ Φ ALL , and link function f :
All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
For a (Φ, f )-regret-matching algorithm, an approach to bounding (1) is to use the (Φ, f )-Blackwell condition and provide a bound on E[G(R Φ t )] for a particular potential function G [17, 16] . Bounding the regret (1) for a (Φ, f, ǫ)−regret-matching algorithm will be done similarly, except the bound on ǫ from Theorem 1 will be used. Proceeding in this fashion yields the following theorem: Theorem 2. Given a real-valued reward system (A, R) a finite set Φ ⊆ Φ ALL of action transformations. If G, g, γ is a Gordon triple 5 , then an approximate (Φ, g)-regret-matching algorithm {L t } ∞ t=1 guarantees at all times t ≥ 0
Bounds

Polynomial Link
Given the polynomial link function f (x) i = (x + i ) p−1 we consider two cases 2 < p < ∞ and 1 < p ≤ 2. For the following results it's useful to denote the maximal activation µ(Φ) = max A |{φ ∈ Φ : φ(a) = δ a }| [17] .
For the case p > 2 we have the following bound on (1). Theorem 3. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ Φ ALL , and the polynomial link function f with p > 2, then an approximate (Φ, f )regret-matching algorithm guarantees
Similarly for the case 1 < p ≤ 2 we have the following. Theorem 4. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ Φ ALL , and the polynomial link function f with 1 < p ≤ 2, then an approximate (Φ, f )regret-matching algorithm guarantees
In comparison to the RRM theorem [11] , the above bound is tighter as there is no |A| term in front of the errors and the |A| term has been replaced by 6 |A| − 1. These improvements are due to the tighter bound in Theorem 1 and the original Φ-regret analysis [17] , respectively. Aside from these differences, the bounds coincide.
Exponential Link
Theorem 5. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ Φ ALL , and an exponential link function f (x) i = e ηxi with η > 0, then an approximate (Φ, f )regret-matching algorithm guarantees
The Hedge algorithm corresponds to the exponential link function f (x) i = e ηxi when Φ = Φ EXT , so Theorem 5 provides a bound on a regression Hedge algorithm. Note that in this case, the approximation error term is not inside a root function as it is under a polynomial link function. This seems to imply that at the level of link outputs, polynomial link functions have a better dependence on the approximation errors. However, g in the exponential link function bound is normalized to the simplex while the polynomial link functions can take on larger values. So which link function has a better dependence on the approximation errors depends on the magnitude of the cumulative regrets, which depends on the environment and the algorithm's empirical performance.
B Proofs
Theorem 1. Given reward system (A,R) , a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ Φ ALL , and link function f :
Proof. We denote r = (r ′ (a)) a∈A as the reward vector for an arbitrary reward function r ′ : A → R.
Since by construction this algorithm chooses L t at each timestep t to be the fixed point ofM t , all that remains to be shown is that this algorithm satisfies the
By expanding the value of interest in the (Φ, f )-Blackwell condition and applying elementary upper bounds, we arrive at the desired bound. For simplicity, we omit timestep indices and set L :
By expanding, as well as multiplying and dividing by (
By the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [22, 23] ,
it is easy to see the inequality still holds. 
Proof. The reasoning is similar to [Lemma 20] [17] . The played fixed point is the same under both link functions, thus following the same steps to Theorem 1 provides the above bound.
Theorem 2. Given a real-valued reward system (A, R) a finite set Φ ⊆ Φ ALL of action transformations. If G, g, γ is a Gordon triple 7 , then an approximate (Φ, g)-regret-matching algorithm {L t } ∞ t=1 guarantees at all times t ≥ 0
Proof. The proof is similar to [Corollary 7] [17] except that the learning algorithm is playing the approximate fixed point with respect to the link function g. From Theorem 1 we have a, r) ).
The result directly follows from Theorem 6 by taking
Theorem 3. Given an ODP, a finite set of action transformations Φ ⊆ Φ ALL , and the polynomial link function f with p > 2, then an approximate (Φ, f )regret-matching algorithm guarantees
Proof. The proof follows closely to [Theorem 9] [17] . Taking G(x) = x + 2 p and γ(x) = (p − 1) x 2 p then G, g, γ is a Gordon triple [17] . Given the above gordon triple we have
≤ G(0) + t sup a∈A,r∈Π γ(ρ Φ (a, r)) + 2U
The first inequality is from Lemma 1. The second inequality follows from Corollary 1 and theorem 2. The third inequality is an application of Lemma 2. The result then immediately follows. Proof. The proof follows closely to [Theorem 11] [17] . Taking G(x) = x + p p and γ(x) = (p − 1) x p p then G, g, γ is a Gordon triple [17] . Given the above Gordon triple we have
≤ G(0) + t sup a∈A,r∈Π
